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ARCHIVISTS WITH AN ATTITUDE

READING TYPOS, READING ARCHIVES
Steven Mailloux

rchivists with an Attitude" sounds like a complaint to an old-style historian and

like a redundancy to a newfangled theorist. A complaint to the historian
because archivists don't have attitudes, they have methods, and copping an attitude is inappropriate for any disciplined researcher. A redundancy to the theorist because being an archival researcher is an attitude, perhaps a problematic one
but nonetheless an acknowledged practice within an intellectual tradition, and taking an attitude goes with the territory--it's not an optional stance but a necessary

condition. However, between the scolding historian and the trivializing theorist,
straw men both, there are archivists with rhetorical attitudes toward history and the-

ory and their interrelation. In what follows I will talk about one such "attitude":
something I call rhetorical hermeneutics. The little history I tell is a rhetorical replay

of a rather brief and hardly noted confrontation between two archival practices:
scholarly editing and deconstructive reading. Doing this history allows me to make
certain theoretical points about archival research and to do so from a rhetorical perspective. That is, I use rhetoric to practice theory by doing history (see Mailloux,
Reception Histories).

To be more exact, I'm going to discuss the exciting topic of reading typos as an
example of archival work. As I present it here, reading typos is a practice within textual scholarship, the material and interpretive history of textual documents, which is
a rather venerable if now somewhat overshadowed tradition of humanistic research

and pedagogy. I begin with two examples of typo reading and then quickly pass on
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to some general claims about editing as a paradigm for critical interpretation. In the
rest of my remarks, I develop only a couple of these claims by discussing in more
detail the second of my opening examples of reading typos, an example that is part
of my history of an archival confrontation between editing and deconstruction, tex-

tual scholarship and poststructuralist theory.
My first example of typo reading is among the most famous in editing lore: E O.
Matthiessen's 1941 tour de force in the American Renaissance. In his interpretation of
White Jacket, Matthiessen praises Melville for his surprising trope, a "soiled fish of the

sea," and claims that "its unexpected linking of the medium of cleanliness (water)
with filth (soiled) could only have sprung from an imagination that had apprehended
the terrors of the deep, of the immaterial deep as well as the physical" (392). As many
of you know, Matthiessen makes a rather egregious scholarly error here, for he carelessly reads a typo for the truth. Melville almost certainly wrote "coiled fish"; this is

what appeared in the first edition, and it was some unknown compositor who miscopied this as "soiled fish" for a later reprint of White Jacket. Matthiessen's archival

negligence in relying on a popular reprint edition has often been used by textual
scholars as a warning to would-be interpreters who ignore the textual history of the
version they are using in their critical studies. Note that the Matthiessen passage ends
with a distinctive binary: "the immaterial" versus "the physical," a figurative opposition that is more generally important to archival research, as I will attempt to show.

My second example of typo reading employs some of the same rhetoric as its

more famous predecessor. Here I quote from G. Thomas Tanselle's 1990 essay,
"Textual Criticism and Deconstruction," published in Studies in Bibliography. In a

footnote to his discussion of Paul de Man's essay "Shelley Disfigured," Tanselle
points out a possible typo in the sentence "Is the status of a text line the status of a
statue?" He notes:
It seems unlikely that de Man meant to say "Is the status of a text line the status of a

statue?", for a "text line" would seem to mean a unit or building block of a text
and would therefore not be parallel with "statue," a whole work. The matter must
remain uncertain, however-as indeed, the constitution of all texts of works is uncertain. (31 n. 16)

In this qualified way, Tanselle proposes amending "line" to "like." Later, I will return
to this proposal and the theoretical argument of which it forms a part, but for now
I wish to build on the next sentence in Tanselle's footnote: "This typographical error,
if it is that, illustrates the necessity for deciding on the makeup of the text as a part
of the act of reading."
Tanselle's claim nicely fits a general argument I want to make about textual edit-

ing as the paradigm for critical and historical interpretation. If "deciding on the
makeup of the text" is an unavoidable act within every reading, then can we not say
that a kind of editing takes place-by omission or commission-in every textual
interpretation? It has always been a mistake, I think, for textual scholars-including
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those who cite the Matthiessen typo reading-to argue merely that r
ing is a necessary preliminary to sound criticism. Rather, it would be

editing is criticism and history, both in the sense that editing is an
same rhetorical activity of interpretation that results in published

lishing a text's literary and historical meaning and in the sense that

a model for understanding many of the most important aspects of al

the rhetorical establishment of textual meaning. I agree with th

such different editorial theorists as Tanselle, Hershel Parker, Jerom

D. C. Greetham-that editing involves interpretation and not just

process of scientific reconstruction. Indeed, editing is perhaps the b

interpretive practice we have. It explicitly demonstrates several chara

interpretive process: (1) its materiality; (2) its embeddedness in trad

and practice; (3) its institutional and cultural locations; and (4) it

rhetorical politics constituted by arguments over ideologies, profess

I cannot develop such observations in detail here, but let me m
explanatory comments. Whether based on replicating a communally
fact or on reconstructing the author's final intentions, the concrete

editing exemplifies the materiality of all interpretation. To interpr

materially one text into another. Such acceptable and approximating

the exact description of the editing process (see Mailloux, Interpreti

This process always takes place within a tradition represented m

archival evidence being used to establish the latest editor's text. Thi

ity is embedded in an interpretive history, which includes the textua

work, and he or she carries out the act of editing within this histor

within the specific disciplinary context of editing procedures, belie

ship, assumptions about discursive practices, views of publishing, an

marin; Fish; Mailloux, Rhetorical Power). And, finally, the interpretiv

is unavoidably situated not only within the rhetorical politics of deb

a writer's biography or stylistic development, but also within larger

troversies involving race relations, class hierarchies, and gender dif

rhetorical politics of reception, see Machor; Cain). Editing a

instances the more general political claim made by Derrida in hi

Fever, and I will presumptuously allow his deferral to stand in for m

Of course, the question of a politics of the archive is our perman
here.... This question will never be determined as one political q

others. It runs through the whole of the field and in truth determin

top to bottom as respublica. There is no political power without control
if not of memory. Effective democratization can always be measured b
criterion: the participation in and the access to the archive, its const

interpretation. (4 n. 1)

ARCHIVISTS: READING TYPOs, READING ARCHIVES 587

Now, let me try to develop a couple of my points about editing and archives by
returning to the typo pointed out by Tanselle. You will remember that Tanselle proposes correcting "line" to "like" in de Man's sentence, changing it to: "Is the status
of a text like the status of a statue?" Tanselle follows the amended sentence with the
remark: "If [de Man] had pursued this question, he might have extricated himself
from his confusion, for he would have recognized that the medium of literature,
unlike that of sculpture, is not tangible and that no tangible rendering of a piece of

verbal communication can be the work itself" (9). Here Tanselle is elaborating on
the central opposition used in his critique of deconstruction, the opposition between
"text" and "work," which is in part dependent on a more basic distinction between
"material" and "immaterial." Tanselle argues that a literary work is immaterial while
a work of sculpture is material and further that texts (arrangements of words) in
material documents are the instructions for constituting immaterial works. He criticizes de Man and the other contributors to the famous 1979 collection Deconstruction and Criticism for not respecting these distinctions, and in this particular passage

he criticizes de Man for failing to pursue a question about poems and statues that
might have clarified the distinction between immaterial works and material texts.
Let's look a little more closely at Tanselle's rhetoric, beginning with his antithe-

sis of text and work. Tanselle's central claim seems to be that the text of any document is not the work itself. The text simply gives instructions for each reader to
reconstruct the ideal entity in his or her mind that was, for example, intended by the

author. Thus, for Tanselle, the text of any particular verbal work does not necessarily exist as such in any single documentary text. There are weak and strong versions
of this claim. The weak version is that every text of a document must be read by a
reader to be understood, and the experience of this reading is different from the text
itself or more exactly from the experience of simply perceiving a document ready to

be read more thoroughly as a text. The weak version of Tanselle's text/work thesis
is simply the useful reminder that there are different temporal moments in the read-

ing process, e.g., perceiving a document, reading its text, establishing its meaning as
a work, and so forth.

I note in passing that the definition of text and work assumed in this weak

version of Tanselle's claim almost exactly reverses several semiological and poststructuralist uses of the terms. That is, whereas here text=material object and
work=immaterial interpretation, some critical theorists claim that work is the mate-

rial and text the interpretation. In 1971, for example, Roland Barthes wrote in
"From Work to Text": "the work can be held in the hand, the text is held in language" (157). Twenty years later, Peter Shillingsburg established a similar distinc-

tion when he noted that Barthes's term "work" corresponded to his own term
"Material Text" and Barthes's "text" to his "Reception Text," the latter being "con-

ceptualized by the reader in the act of reading" (56-57 n. 31; 81; see also Mowitt).
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Nevertheless, despite this history of contrary usage, Tanselle's redefin
does not vitiate the weak version of his argument.

But the strong version of Tanselle's thesis is another kettle of soil

gether. It claims that there is an immaterial ontological existence to a w

scends its representation in any material object. For Tanselle the w

exists in an ideal realm independent of its textual manifestation in a p

unpublished archival document. Moreover, Tanselle goes on to sugg
ars cannot be certain they have reached this ideal realm of works in t

apparently, they can be certain about the material realm of document

textual platonism difficult to fathom. The commonsense view that dif

ial texts do seem to represent contrasting versions of the same work ca

edged without resorting to an ideal realm of the immaterial Work. Fo
might agree with Shillingsburg when he claims that "The term Work

Moby-Dick do not refer to a thing, an object, but rather to a class of ob

that "a Work is in important ways both plural and fragmented" (

could go even further in rejecting Tanselle's idealism and agree w

McGann, who has said that "far from representing an 'alien' condition

it seems to me that 'the physical' (whether oral or written) is their on

(qtd. in Greetham 9 n. 14).

Be that as it may, Tanselle attempts to support his material-text/ide

tinction by a related one: the difference between verbal works, like li

criticism, and physical works, like painting and statues. Unlike verbal
are material entities in which material texts and immaterial works occ

space, according to Tanselle (Rationale 21-33). I realize that this diff

right at first hearing, but it is just as problematic as the text/work dist

have to do is start noting examples of etchings or bronze statues prod

ple versions. But even if we talk about single paintings or statues, diffe

and place make for differences in works, that is, differences in inter
experiences of these artifacts. I see no qualitative difference between

or book existing in one copy and a statue existing in one copy. All hav

preted and experienced by readers/observers. "Is the status of a text l
of a statue?" Yes, sometimes it is.

Which brings me back to reading the de Man typo. In his commen

selle's essay, D. C. Greetham argues for the reading "text line" over "t
rather, he rereads Tanselle's reading as "humorous" and then carries on
vein. He writes that Tanselle's footnote on the emendation of "like" fo

both salutary, and in its irony, very funny, a play with the text reminisce

orate textuality of Nabokov's Pale Fire. And entering further into the

editorial play on the text in the deconstructive essay, one could per

that, according to the classical doctrine of lectio difficilior probior est ("

ficult reading is the more moral"), the "text line" reading, because o
opacity (but not complete implausibility) is more likely to be authorial
torial. (12-13)
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Let me use this pseudo-controversy over reading a typo to conclude these
remarks. "Is the status of a text [line or like] the status of a statue?" I have already
employed de Man's question to punctuate my questioning of the usefulness of the
work/text and the verbal-text/material-statue distinctions in theory. But what about

in practice? Is Tanselle right in claiming that texts of verbal works are finally indeterminate because one cannot be as certain about them as texts of statues? Is
Tanselle's decision to amend the de Manian text any less determinate than placing a
statue in a museum and calling it "the work"? He seems to claim as much when he
says that the correctness of his proposed emendation of "line" to "like" "must remain

uncertain, however-as, indeed, the constitution of all texts of works is uncertain"

(31 n. 16).
I would suggest a different conclusion: "Certainty" is relative to rhetorical context. That is, certainty about the correctness of Tanselle's proposal depends on the
argument made for the emendation proposed, the disciplinary protocols holding in
the community in which the argument happens, and a host of other rhetorical factors. Accordingly, I would make the following argument in support of Tanselle's pro-

posed emendation and against Greetham's playful defense of the first published
version.

De Man was on sabbatical from Yale in 1978 when a staff member of his depart-

ment typed the manuscript of "Shelley Disfigured." This typescript was sent to an
editor at Seabury Press in New York for inclusion in the volume Deconstruction and
Criticism, which was published in 1979. The typescript contains corrections in de
Man's own hand, and the typescript version of the problematic sentence reads "like"
instead of the first published edition's "line." When "Shelley Disfigured" was then
reprinted in de Man's posthumously published Rhetoric of Romanticism, the sentence

again reads "like," even though the printer's copy for the essay was the publisher's
version in Deconstruction and Criticism. What happened? De Man died in December
1983, and proof sheets of the essays were sent to Andrzej Warminski and two other
colleagues in March 1984. They used the original typescript to correct the proofs of
"Shelley Disfigured" and changed the page proofs' "line" back to the original typescript's "like." Case closed. At least for the moment. Playfully or not, I claim that this

historical evidence, including an archival typescript that is as material as any statue,

helps me to settle the dispute between Tanselle and Greetham and settle it in as
determinate a way as any setting up of a statue in the Chicago Museum of Contemporary Art. You see, it's all in the rhetoric, whether theory or history, texts or typos.
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